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TAXATION
The 1974-75 term provided no surprises in the federal taxa-
tion area. Generally, Tenth Circuit decisions were in agreement
with those of other circuits. Four of the more interesting tax opin-
ions have been selected for brief comment.
I. Wortham Machinery Co. v. United States, 521 F.2d 160
(10th Cir. 1975)
In Wortham Machinery Co. v. United States' a corporation's
payment of a note which two of its major stockholders had per-
sonally guaranteed was held to constitute an economic benefit,
taxable to the stockholders as a constructive dividend. The stock-
holders, two brothers, owned 63 percent in Wortham Machinery
Co. (Wortham). One of the brothers joined with others to form a
second corporation, Madera Manufacturing Co. (Madera). The
new business was not prospering, so a bank loan of $85,000 was
arranged, secured by a pledge of all outstanding stock in Madera
and by the Norris brothers' personal guarantees. The personal
guarantees were required because the bank did not permit one
corporation (Wortham) to guarantee a loan made to another
(Madera).' Wortham made payments of $3,000 per month on the
note for over 2 years and eventually took over all of Madera's
assets and liabilities.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that
Wortham's payments on the loan to Madera were constructive
dividends paid to Wortham's stockholders.' Citing United States
v. Smith,4 the court defined a constructive dividend as a
corporation's conferring of "an economic benefit on a stockholder
without expectation of repayment."5 Because the company's pay-
ments reduced the amount of the brothers' liability on their guar-
antee, they had clearly enjoyed an economic benefit. The individ-
521 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 Wortham Mach. Co. v. United States, 375 F.Supp. 835, 837 (D. Wyo. 1974).
521 F.2d at 164.
418 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1969). For similar holdings from other circuits, see, e.g., Sachs
v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 383 (1960); Ferro v.
Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957); Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.
1947).
521 F.2d at 164.
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ual taxpayers' failure to prove an intention to repay Wortham was
held to constitute the requisite lack of expectation of repayment.'
II. Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1974)
The Internal Revenue Code delineates the statute of limita-
tions applicable to tax refund claims, barring suits instituted
more than 2 years after statutory notice of a disallowance of re-
fund.' In Kelson v. United States8 taxpayer Kelson filed two suc-
cessive claims for the refund of his 1964 tax. The basis of the first
claim, filed in 1967, was a carryback arising from a stock loss. In
March 1968 the second claim was filed, *based on the same loss
carryback and, additionally, losses on two promissory notes.
In May 1968, pursuant to statute,' Mr. Kelson was mailed
notification of the disallowance of the first claim. The second was
disallowed on December 31, 1969. In 1971 Kelson filed the instant
suit for the refund of taxes paid in 1964. Because this was more
than 2 years after the first notice of disallowance, the suit would
be barred as to the stock loss unless the second claim for refund
extended the 2-year limit.
The court held that a second claim neither interrupts nor
extends the time limitation when it merely reasserts a prior
claim. Allowing such repetitive claims would indefinitely extend
the statute and defeat its purpose.'0 The court further held that
such claims are divisible. That portion of Kelson's second claim
which had not been stated in the prior claim was timely, and,
therefore, the court examined the merits of the claim as to the
promissory notes."
III. Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974)
Hayutin v. Commissioner 2 involved a dispute over the cor-
rect treatment of installment payments made pursuant to a di-
Id.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6532(a)(1).
503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1974).
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6532(a)(1).
' 503 F.2d at 1293. This decision is consistent with those of the Second, Fourth, and
Seventh Circuits. See, e.g., Union Bleachery v. United States, 176 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 964 (1950); 18th Street Leader Stores, Inc. v. United States, 142
F.2d 113 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 725 (1944); Einson-Freeman Co. v. Corwin, 112
F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693 (1940).
" 503 F.2d at 1293-94.
" 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974).
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vorce property settlement agreement. The agreement provided
for a lump-sum settlement, part of which was to be paid in
monthly installments over an 18-year period. The right of prepay-
ment was granted, and all claims to alimony were waived.
The former husband claimed that the payments were made
in satisfaction of an obligation incurred by reason of the marital
relationship and, therefore, deductible by him. The ex-wife main-
tained that the payments were a division of property, nontaxable
to her.
The Tenth Circuit had previously ruled that under Colorado
law a wife has no vested rights in her husband's property, and
such payments are in the nature of a personal obligation.'" The
Colorado Supreme Court, in In re Questions Submitted by
United States District Court,'4 attempted to create an exception
to this rule, holding that property rights vest at the time of filing
the divorce action. Thus, transfers under a property settlement
agreement would be a division of property between coowners.
In Hayutin the Tenth Circuit held that the Colorado Su-
preme Court's characterization was not controlling for tax pur-
poses. Looking at the "true nature of the transfer under Colorado
law," the court ruled that, although a burden was placed upon
the husband's property, the wife did not become a part owner. '
Therefore, only payments made by a spouse in acquiring individ-
ual ownership of specific property represent a division of prop-
erty. Other payments are made in satisfaction of a marital obliga-
tion and are taxable to the wife and deductible by the husband.
IV. Wagner v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1975)
Wagner v. Commissioner'6 dealt with the issue of when the
sale of real estate is complete for purposes of determining who
may take a depreciation deduction. An installment contract pro-
vided that the property was purchased in the condition existing
on the contract date. As of that date, the property was subject to
," Pullman v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836
(1964).
"4 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974). For a discussion of this and other state court opinions,
see Note, Federal Taxation of Divorce Property Settlements and the Amiable Fictions of
State Law, 52 DENVER L.J. 799 (1975).
," 508 F.2d at 468.
Is 518 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1975).
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a lease, and the contract provided that the seller would retain all
rents until expiration of the lease in exchange for his paying the
taxes and insurance during that period. Even so, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the buyer was the owner for purposes of deduction
of depreciation.
In discussing the facts emphasized by the Tax Court, the
Tenth Circuit considered the trade of rent for the payment of
taxes and insurance to be irrelevant to ownership, because the
trade was only a dollar exchange. The circuit court further noted
that where property is sold subject to an existing lease, possession
is not a necessary element of ownership, entitling one to a depre-
ciation deduction.
According to the Tax Court, the buyer had bargained for the
taxes, insurance, and rent terms for the purpose of receiving fin-
ancial benefit, and such benefit precluded entitlement to a depre-
ciation deduction. The Tenth Circuit, basing its decision on
Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner," reversed, holding
that a "dollar loss" was not a prerequisite to an allowance of the
deduction.'"
Wagner seems to be a reasonable extension of Fribourg.
Nonetheless, in Kem v. Commissioner," the Ninth Circuit com-
pletely ignored Fribourg and stated that "if no loss is suffered, no
allowance for depreciation is reasonable."20 A clarification of
Fribourg by the Supreme Court, answering the question whether
some form of "economic loss" must be found before a deprecia-
tion deduction is allowed, would be helpful. Wagner and Kern
have left that question open.
17 383 U.S. 272 (1966), cited in 518 F.2d at 658.
18 Fribourg involved a great increase in the value of a ship due to the closing of the
Suez Canal. The Supreme Court held that the sale of an asset in excess of its adjusted
basis was not in itself grounds for redetermining depreciation allowances. Id. at 277.
i' 432 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 963.
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